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“How can one be against  human rights  nowadays? It’s  the same as to be  
against motherhood.” 
Giorgi Arbatov,  director of the official  Institute for  the Study of  the 
United  States  and  Canada  and  close  advisor  to  Mikhail  Gorbachev. 
(Arbatov and Oltmans 1983:144). 
In the late 1980s Czechoslovakia was considered one of the more repressive 
countries in Eastern Europe and a staunch Soviet ally. In the aftermath of the 
1968  “Prague  Spring”,  repressed  with  Soviet  help,  the  regime  managed  to 
remove virtually all expressions of dissent. Yet in the fall of 1989 civil society 
forces  inspired  a  popular  uprising  that  put  an  end  to  Czechoslovakian 
authoritarianism and ushered in a transition to democracy. How could a “Velvet 
Revolution” from below take place in such a repressive context? What role did 
civil society actors play in the transition? And what structural and international 
factors help us solve this puzzle? These are some of the questions this working 
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paper seeks to answer.
Periodization
The question of periodization is, as always, a difficult one, both in theoretical 
and methodological terms. Three potential starting points may be identified for 
the democratization process, resulting in one long-term, one medium-term, and 
one  short-term  periodization.  Addressed  in  chronological  order,  the  first 
possible starting point  is  the 1968 Prague Spring. If one adopts this starting 
point  the  1989  Velvet  Revolution  definitely  assumes  more  of  a  “top-down” 
character.  On April  5, 1968, the planning committee of the Czechoslovakian 
Communist Party adopted Dubček’s “Action Program” which 
called for the abolition of censorship, the systematic use of opinion polls in the 
decision  making  process,  the  inclusion  of  a  multiplicity  of  groups  and 
organisations in the administration of the state, open debate with representatives 
of ‘bourgeois ideology’, the right to travel abroad, further rehabilitation of the 
unjustly persecuted,  the replacement of incompetent officials, changes to the 
electoral system, devolution of power in the party, the introduction of a socialist 
market  economy and  greater  autonomy for  Slovakia  in  the  form of  a  new 
federal arrangement. In short, it offered the prospect of socialism with a human 
face. (Shepherd 2000: 27) 
Given  the  timing  (the  height  of  the  Cold  War)  and  location  (a  totalitarian 
communist country) of the Action Program, it is no exaggeration to call this an 
elite attempt at democratization. Evidently this is how Moscow interpreted the 
Czechoslovakian developments, as shortly after the announcement of the Action 
Program Warsaw Pact  troops  entered and occupied the  country.  Non-violent 
resistance  to  the  invasion  followed  and  the  reformist  communist  leaders, 
including Dubček himself, were soon purged from the party. While ultimately 
unsuccessful, it is impossible to deny the impact the Prague Spring had on the 
Velvet  Revolution,  as  it  revealed  the  true  nature  of  Czechoslovakia’s 
relationship  with  the  USSR  and  the  undemocratic  character  of  the  Prague 
leadership.
The proposed mid-term starting point of the democratization process can 
be placed during the mid-1970s, around the time of the 1975 Helsinki Final Act 
and the 1977 creation (or at least the “coming out”) of Charter 77. If one desires 
to take a bottom-up approach to the democratization process, this is the natural 
starting  point  as  it  represents  the  renaissance  of  opposition  activities  in 
Czechoslovakia. It could be argued that the activists of this period were part of 
certain elites – Havel and his colleagues were not blue-collar workers but rather 
more or less public intellectuals – yet I would personally be inclined to see this 
as the most important period in the process. Coupled with the emergence of 
Gorbachev as the new leader of the USSR in the mid-1980s, the Helsinki Final 
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Act  represents  the  major  political  opportunity  structure  for  the  opposition. 
Consequently I  will  return to  the mid-1970s in  my discussions  of  structural 
conditions and political opportunities.
Finally, if one wants to take an extreme bottom-up approach, then a very 
short-term periodization  may  be  suitable.  The  protests  that  occurred  in  the 
second half of 1988 and in 1989 were largely spontaneous and not necessarily 
organized  by  Charter  77  activists.  Religious  groups  and  students  were  the 
driving  forces  of  these  protests,  and  students  in  particular  played  the  most 
important  role  in  the  November  17  demonstration  that  sparked  the  Velvet 
Revolution. The danger of taking the mid- to late-1980s as the beginning of the 
democratization process lies in the fact that such an explanation is necessarily 
ahistorical, and, in my opinion, incorrect. 
My  recommendation  would  be  to  emphasize  the  role  played  by  civil 
society  in  all  three  of  the  stages  I  have  identified  and  thereby  show  how 
democratization  occurs  through  cycles  of  protests,  each  of  which  may  look 
different  but  nonetheless  contributes  to  a  coherent  oppositional  narrative.  It 
seems quite plausible that the 1968 non-violent resistance to the Warsaw Pact 
invasion helped establish a culture of peaceful opposition in Czech and Slovak 
minds that came in handy in 1989. Similarly, the human rights pressure exerted 
by Charter 77 in the late 1970s and throughout the 1980s contributed to the 
weakening of  the regime and the possibility  of  exploiting Gorbachev’s  twin 
policies  of  Glasnost and  Perestroika.  In  short,  a  historicized  periodization 
dating back to 1968 that emphasizes the transforming events of that year, the 
mid-1970s, and the mid-1980s appears a sound path to take.  
As for the end point of the democratization process, a few options are 
available  here  too.  The  first  would  be  the  conclusion  of  the  roundtable 
discussions  on  December  9  1989,  which  resulted  in  the  creation  of  a 
“Government  of  National  Understanding”  that  contained  communists  and 
oppositionists alike. President Husák swore in this government on the 10th and 
then resigned. One could add the ascendance of Václav Havel to the presidency 
on  December  29th to  this  end  point  (Glenn  2001:  188;  Urban  1990:  122). 
Another option would be to use the fact that
 
on January 30, 1990, the Federal Assembly was joined by 120 new deputies; 
only 8 were Communists. Out of the 350 members of the assembly, 152 were 
now nonparty members; there were 138 Communists, l8 Socialists, 18 People’s 
Party members, 5 Slovak Freedom Party members, 4 (Slovak) Democratic Party 
members, 3 Social Democrats, 6 members from four small parties, and 6 vacant 
seats.  The Communists  had  become,  after  forty-two years,  a  minority  party 
again. The Federal Assembly was to remain basically unchanged until the June 
1990 elections. (Calda 1996: 1164-5) 
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The fact that the communists were now in the minority suggests that a transition 
to  democracy  had  occurred.  Finally,  one  could  use  either  the  June  1990 
elections or  the “velvet  divorce” of  1993 to mark the firm establishment  of 




In  order  to  understand  the  structural  conditions  that  set  the  stage  for 
democratization in Czechoslovakia it is useful to consider the country’s history 
since the beginning of communist rule following World War II. Unlike most of 
the other countries that were to become Soviet satellites, Czechoslovakia was a 
wealthy country with a high standard of living (Shepherd 2000: 24). As Urban 
(1990) explains,
the Czechoslovak experience under Communism was bitter for several reasons. 
A  highly  industrialised  country,  like  Czechoslovakia,  with  a  relatively 
developed economic  infrastructure,  was much more  sensitive  to  the  extreme 
unsuitability of the centralized Communist planning system than were the other 
East European countries managed by Communist  governments after  the war. 
There was also a lot more to squander. In comparison with its neighbours, the 
economy was not damaged by war. (103) 
Thanks  to  its  relative  wealth,  Czechoslovak  politicians  could  “buy”  support 
from the people for the greater part of the communist era by providing decent 
living standards. However, by the late 1980s “the structural weaknesses of the 
Czechoslovak economy had become both unavoidable and unmanageable” and 
this  fact,  accompanied  by  a  “growing  public  awareness  of  economic 
stagnation… gave additional fuel to the opposition” (Judt 1992: 96-7). The days 
in  which  the  government  could  pacify  discontent  through  subsidies  were 
coming to an end.
While economic dissatisfaction undoubtedly played an important role in 
increasing opposition to the government, the Velvet Revolution was also fought 
for political reasons. The absence of basic civil and political liberties, including 
freedoms of expression,  association,  and religion,  as  well  as  the widespread 
inability  to  choose  one’s  profession  (Falk  2003:  89),  was  perhaps  an  even 
greater  source  of  discontent  than  the  country’s  economic  shortcomings. 
However,  the  Czechoslovak  civil  rights  situation  was  not  uncommon  in 
comparison to many other authoritarian countries both prior and after 1989, so 
why does this dimension play a large role in the Czechoslovak transition to 
democracy? To answer that question we must move from the domestic to the 
international  level  and  revisit  one  of  the  points  mentioned  in  the  previous 
section, namely the 1975 Helsinki Agreements.
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Stokes (1993) has emphasized the importance of this monumental treaty, 
part of the détente between the East and West, for the development of viable 
opposition movements behind the Iron Curtain: 
These agreements concluded a two-year series of negotiations concerning peace 
and security in Europe that had become possible in the early 1970s, when West 
Germany changed its long-standing policy of hostility toward East Germany. 
Ever since the creation of two Germanies after World War II the Soviet Union 
had  advocated  an  international  conference  to  regularize  the  status  of  East 
Germany  and  to  confirm  the  western  border  of  Poland,  but  under  Konrad 
Adenauer West Germany had refused to deal with East Germany at all. As soon 
as  a  new  West  German  chancellor,  Willy  Brandt,  announced  a  policy  of 
reconciliation  with  East  Germany  in  1969  (Ostpolitik),  the  Soviet  Union 
renewed its calls for such a conference. Formal negotiations began in 1973, and 
in the summer of 1975 representatives of thirty-five countries, including all of 
those in Eastern Europe except Albania, signed the Final Act in Helsinki. (23-4) 
Critics of the agreement argued that the Final Act represented a Soviet victory 
over  the  West.  However,  in  exchange  for  gaining  recognition  of  its 
conceptualization of East Germany, the Communist Bloc reluctantly committed 
itself to a framework for human rights.  “The so-called ‘Basket Three’ of the 
agreements  committed  all  signatories  to  respect  ‘civil,  economic,  social, 
cultural, and other rights and freedoms, all of which derive from the inherent 
dignity of the human person’” (Stokes 1993: 24). To use my own theoretical 
framework (Ritter 2012), the Helsinki Final Act, ratified by the Czechoslovak 
Federal Assembly on November 11, 1975 and coming into force on March 23 
the following year, began to ensnare the government in its very own iron cage 
of liberalism (ICL), as activists “began to see the Final Act not as a ratification 
of  the  status  quo,  as  the  Communist  regimes  were  portraying  it,  but  as  a 
promising  and unprecedented  opportunity  to  challenge  the  repressiveness  of 
those regimes” (Thomas 1999: 209). As I will  show in the next section, the 
Helsinki  accords  combined  with  Gorbachev’s  policies  of  glasnost  and 
perestroika to create a tremendous political opportunity (an ICL if there ever 
was one) that helped set the Velvet Revolution on its path to success. 
It is important to note that a key reason the Helsinki Final Act became so 
problematic for the Czechoslovak government, similarly to East Germany but 
unlike Romania, was the fact that Czechoslovakia was so closely connected to 
Moscow due to its history of Soviet support and intervention. Heimann (2009) 
has nicely captured this dynamic as she explains that  
the one Communist leadership in the world that could not afford to retreat even 
an  inch  from  the  official  line  as  officially  broadcast  from  Moscow  in  the 
summer of 1968 was, of course, the Czechoslovak one. The Husák leadership 
had justified its rise to power on two ideological pillars: the need to oppose 
reforms of the kind proposed during the Prague Spring; and moves towards an 
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ever-closer ‘friendship’ (political, economic and diplomatic ties) with the Soviet 
Union.  But  just  as  Khrushchev had created  problems for  the  KSČ and  KSS 
leaderships in the mid-1950s with his denunciations of Stalin, twenty years later 
the  Soviet  Union  again  pulled  the  rug  out  from  under  the  Czechoslovak 
Communist leadership. This time, pressure came in the form of the US-Soviet 
policy shift known as détente, which required the Soviet Union to make at least 
some concessions to improve its human-rights record in exchange for slowing 
down the nuclear-arms race. (282)
Having initially benefitted (especially after 1968) from strong Soviet support in 
its  efforts  to  restore  order  after  the  Prague  Spring,  the  government’s  close 
relationship with Moscow now began to become a problem. After all, how could 
the “undoubtedly … most consistently Stalinist and repressive [government] in 
Europe” (Judt 1992: 108)1 combine its inclination towards widespread, albeit 
largely non-violent repression, with a stated commitment to human rights? The 
answer is that in the long run it could not, and this contradiction, I would argue,  
is what ultimately brought the government down.
It  seems the  group of  intellectuals  who eventually  created  Charter  77 
shared this evaluation. Recognizing the potential for mobilization inherent in 
Czechoslovakia’s signature of the Final Act, an anonymous opposition report 
expressed new hope in the face of the recent developments: 
If  we disregard our subjective feelings and views… we must admit  that  the 
results of the European security conference, although no more than a beginning, 
are  still  promising.  Even  the  few  new  things  that  the  West  succeeded  in 
incorporating into the document could represent a step forward, provided they 
will be complied with. (Kusin 1978: 293)
These intellectuals thus realized that their task would be to make sure that the 
terms of the Final act were indeed “complied with.”  Furthermore, after seeing a 
copy of the bulletin of Laws and Ordinances that contained Ordinance 120 (the 
provision that incorporated the Final Act into Czechoslovakian law), they “felt 
enough disgust with the regime to wish to challenge some of its hypocrisies 
openly… The result was the formation, in the first week of 1977, of a would-be 
human-rights  watchdog  and  pressure  group  calling  itself  ‘Charter  77’” 
(Heimann 2009: 284). 
Contingent Political Opportunities
The Helsinki Final Act not only represents one of the most important structural 
conditions under which the democratization process began; it is also one of the 
1 Judt (1992) qualifies this statement by adding that he is “leaving aside the special case of Romania in the later 
years of the megalomaniacal Nicolae Ceauşescu” (108)
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first political opportunities that presented itself to the emerging opposition. As 
one  commentator  notes,  “a  small  group  of  intellectuals  living  in  Prague… 
believed that they had finally found a chink in the regime’s armour” (Heimann 
2009: 284), as “they simply demanded that regimes follow their own laws on 
human rights, which of course was the last thing regimes intent on retaining 
social control were willing to do… This process, more than any single political, 
economic, or military event, is what doomed the Communist regimes of Eastern 
Europe”  (Stokes  1993:  23).  The  “intellectuals”  Heimann  refers  to  were  the 
founders of Charter 77, and I will return to that organization in my discussion of 
civil society.
The Helsinki  Accords  did  indeed provide  the  opposition  with  its  first 
political opportunity to challenge the regime, but until the mid-1980s Charter 77 
and  other  similar  organizations  made  minimal  progress  on  the  path  to 
democratization. It was not until Mikhail Gorbachev became the new General 
Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in 1985 that the human 
rights framework the opposition had tried to employ for the past 8 years began 
to show signs of effectiveness.
While Gorbachev had established himself as a reformer from the early 
days  of  his  rule,  the  announcement  of  the  twin  policies  of  glasnost and 
perestroika in 1988 is what really provided the opposition movement with its 
crucial political opportunity. Arguing that the Soviet Union was in desperate 
need  of  economic  revival,  Gorbachev  launched  his  program  of  perestroika 
(restructuring), designed to introduce some free market elements in the socialist 
economic  system.  It  should  be  noted  that  Gorbachev’s  intention  was not  to 
dismantle  the planned economy system,  but  simply  to  resuscitate  it.  Shortly 
after  the  introduction  of  his  economic  reforms,  Gorbachev  announced  the 
complementary political reform of glasnost (openness), which would guarantee 
the protection of  some of  the civil  and human rights  the Soviet  people had 
previously had to do without (Long 2005; Saxonberg 2001).
While Gorbachev’s reforms had far reaching consequences in the USSR 
and in some of the other Soviet satellites,
the effects of [his] experiments in perestroika and glasnost in the Soviet Union, 
together with his increasingly hands-off approach to the rest of the Warsaw Pact 
countries, did not really begin to make themselves felt in Czechoslovakia – as 
opposed  to  Poland  or  Hungary  –  until  1987  or  even  1988,  and  then  only 
patchily… By 1988, there had been some cadre changes, a loosening of the 
limits  of  what  it  was  permissible  to  publish  or  say  in  public  and,  most 
dramatically, an end to the jamming of foreign broadcasts. (Heimann 2009: 295)
However,  in  January  1989,  the  Communist  Party  of  Czechoslovakia  finally 
recognized that it had no choice but to follow Moscow’s lead and implement 
economic and political reforms of its own. It did so through the launch of its 
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own take on restructuring,  přestavba. This adjustment was accompanied by a 
handful of democratization measures that mainly entailed the decentralization of 
economic decision-making. The regime also announced that it would provide 
the nation with a new constitution that went as far as omitting any reference to 
the “leading role” of the party or its communist ideology (Heimann 2009: 295). 
Gorbachev’s  reforms  did  not  only  influence  the  decisions  of 
Czechoslovakian politicians by forcing them in the direction of democratization 
and  economic  reform.  As  Saxonberg  (2001)  explains,  “conservative  leaders 
became afraid, while reformists became optimistic. Hopes and expectations of 
change rose among the populace as well” (137). These feelings of imminent 
change  was  further  reinforced  when  Gorbachev  allowed  somewhat  free 
elections to take place in Poland, elections that resulted in a non-communist 
victory, and his decision to not interfere when the Berlin Wall came tumbling 
down. As a consequence “Czechs and Slovaks realized he would not support a 
violent  solution in  their  country  either”  (Saxonberg 2001:  137),  which most 
probably contributed to the large turnouts at the mass demonstrations that came 
to symbolize the Velvet Revolution.
The combination of the Helsinki Final Act and Gorbachev’s compatible 
reforms allowed the opposition movement in Eastern Europe to put pressure on 
the  government  without  risking  a  1968  scenario.  After  all,  “how  could 
Gorbachev  support  democratization  at  home  if  it  were  dangerous  abroad? 
Gorbachev would have had to retreat from glasnost, and thus economic reform 
at home as well” (Saxonberg 2001: 136). Because the Soviet premier was at this 
point far from popular among the more conservative members of his party, he 
had no choice  but  to  stick  to  his  guns  even as  the  Soviet  empire  began to 
collapse. Abandoning his reform program would have alienated those within the 
party who supported him, leaving him politically isolated. In short, Gorbachev 
had gone “all-in” and pro-democracy activists throughout the Communist Bloc 
recognized this fact. As Skilling (1991) reports,
 
in the latter part of the 1980s, after the launching of Gorbachev’s programme of 
perestroika and glasnost, there was an explosion of independent initiatives and 
informal activity in the USSR, which soon spread to Poland and Hungary, in 
more limited scope to the GDR and Czechoslovakia and in even lesser degree to 
Romania and Bulgaria. (11)
With his reform program Gorbachev had opened a political Pandora’s box he 
was unable to close.
Although Gorbachev and his reforms unequivocally represent the most 
important political opportunity of the Czechoslovak democratization movement, 
three  other  POSs  are  worth  mentioning.  First,  the  government’s  decision  to 
prosecute members of the rock band The Plastic People of the Universe in 1976 
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on charges of “organized disturbance of the peace” has been identified as the 
event that caused Havel and others to write Charter 77. The obvious discord 
between the charges and the signing of the Helsinki Final Act into law in the 
same year as the trial apparently constituted a moral outrage too severe for the 
intellectuals to contain. Second, and as mentioned in passing above, the reform 
movements that took place elsewhere in the region, first in Poland and Hungary 
and later in East Germany, certainly had an effect on Czechoslovakian activists 
and citizens in general. If these governments could fall, why couldn’t theirs? 
Finally, the November 17th student demonstration that triggered the revolution 
benefitted from false rumors that a student had been killed by security forces. 
Although not true, and despite the fact that the government eventually located 
the “dead” student and paraded him before the TV cameras, the process had 
taken too long and already led to radicalization of the movement.    
Elites
The issue of elites in Czechoslovakia is a fairly straightforward affair: only one 
elite  group  truly  matters,  namely  the  political  elite.  As  seen  above, 
Czechoslovakia  was,  at  least  since  1968,   one  of  the  most  Stalinist  and 
repressive regimes in Eastern Europe. Because socialism reigned supreme, there 
really were no economic elites to speak of.  As for  a potential  military elite, 
“Czechoslovakia  shared with  other  East  European regimes  the  characteristic 
features of civil-military relations common to all state-socialist regimes” (Ekiert 
1996:  149).  Furthermore,  the Soviet  Union maintained strong links with the 
country’s military, which helps explain why the armed forces remained neutral 
during  the  demonstrations  that  threatened  to  end  the  dominance  of  the 
Communist Party. Because of the relative lack of economic and military elites, 
the discussion here will focus on the political elite, that is, the upper echelons of 
the Communist Party.
Unlike some other authoritarian governments, including communist ones 
in Eastern Europe,  the Czechoslovakian communist  party did not experience 
important internal divisions in the period leading up to the Velvet Revolution. 
The main reason for this appears to be the failed attempts at liberalization from 
above by Dubček and other reformists in the 1960s. Their attempt to introduce 
the Action Program resulted in their eventual purging and dismissal from the 
party. For whatever reason, no new generation of party reformers emerged in 
the following 20 years. In fact, the reform communists of 1989 were the same 
reform communists of 1968, headed by Dubček himself, who became chairman 
of the National Assembly after the fall of communism. Because the Communist 
Party  of  Czechoslovakia  had  not  imprisoned  or  executed  “misguided”  party 
members and leaders, these purged and formerly influential communists were 
able to form  Obroda,  “a natural network of former communists purged after 
1968” in the early months of 1989. The late founding date of the organization 
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suggests that this “counter-elite” cannot really be considered a political force 
until very late in the democratization process, even though the Communist Party 
met with Obroda to  “discuss the development of reconstruction and perestroika 
in Czechoslovakia” (Glenn 2001: 136-7).
Given its character as one of the most repressive and entrenched regimes 
in Eastern Europe, the Czechoslovakian leadership did relatively little to defend 
their  position  once  the  Velvet  Revolution  began  with  the  November  17 th 
demonstrations. Interestingly enough, the government never lost control of any 
of its security forces, including the military, the People’s  Militia, the regular 
police force, or the feared secret police. In fact,
the available evidence suggests that [the police and military] remained active in 
the  early  days  of  the  revolution,  halting  a  student  demonstration  from 
continuing toward Prague Castle on November 20 and infiltrating the striking 
theaters.  According  to  a  subsequent  investigation  into  the  activities  of  the 
Czechoslovak People’s Army, tanks and soldiers were deployed to Prague and a 
security measure entitled Intervention was prepared by the minister of national 
defense;  the Ministry,  however,  awaited orders  from the Central  Committee, 
which  opted  for  a  ‘political’ rather  than  a  military solution  to  the  problem. 
(Glenn 2001: 133)
Realizing that Moscow would not support a “Tiananmen Square solution,” and 
discovering that “a branch of the People’s Militia proclaimed that it would ‘not 
take steps’ against ‘working people’ or ‘working youth, including the student 
community’, but instead work ‘to build socialism in common and work towards 
perestroika’” (Heimann 2009: 303), the government seems to have recognized 
that the battle was lost early on. Compelling evidence that no member of the 
political elite wanted to take responsibility for repression of the movement is 
presented  by  Saxonberg,  who  shows that  although  security  forces  had  been 
mobilized no orders were issued to employ them (2001: 338). That the regime 
decided to not put up a fight early on is also suggested by the fact that the party, 
following the initial demonstrations on November 17th concluded that 
 “the Party must not be frightened of the truth, even if it is sometimes hard and 
unpleasant – it is absolutely necessary to tell the truth in the press, radio and 
television,” and equally “necessary” to “publicize the video recordings of the 
police  intervention  of  November  17  and,  after  the  state  prosecutor’s 
investigation, to publish its results in the mass media.” (Heimann 2009: 303-4)
While difficult to prove, it seems reasonable to conclude that the government’s 
decision to refrain from outright repression can be traced to Moscow’s open 
declaration that it would not interfere in the internal politics of its satellites.
It  should also be mentioned briefly that  other  political parties existed: 
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“The Socialist Party, the People’s Party, the (Slovak) Democratic Party, and the 
(Slovak) Party of Freedom had continued an embryonic and enslaved existence 
under the old regime, nominally independent but under Communist control via 
the so-called National  Front” (Judt 1992: 102).  While these parties regained 
their independence after the revolution, their position before its occurrence was 
too weak for its members to qualify as elite. Finally, the cultural elite, could 
potentially have been a group worth considering under the heading of elites. 
However, the most influential members of this group had forfeited their position 
as  an  elite  through their  opposition  to  the  state  and  the  imprisonments  and 
banishments that often followed as a logical consequence of this,. Instead they 
became the leaders of the embryonic civil society.
Civil Society
In contrast to Hungary and Poland, Czechoslovakia’s civil  society developed 
late. There are several reasons for this. First, the Prague Spring, which I have 
identified as the beginning of the democratization process, was not the product 
of civil society organizing, but rather a top-down initiative from party leaders. 
As  a  consequence,  civil  society  had  not  experienced  any  boost  during  the 
protest activities against the Soviet invasion and did not therefore emerge as a 
force to be reckoned with in its aftermath (Ekiert 1996: 123-4). However, a few 
political organizations, such as the Club of Non-Party Engagés (KAN) and K-
231, “an organization of former political prisoners,” did rise from the ashes of 
the Prague Spring, and although these groups did not constitute a vibrant civil 
society,  KAN  in  particular  represented  “a  nascent  and  broad-based  social 
movement, and an important political example for a later movement of much 
greater importance and impact: Civic Forum. Not unsurprisingly, Vaclav Havel 
was a member” (Falk 2003: 76-7).
As  the  Czechoslovakian  regime  hardened  in  the  years  after  1968 
following  party  purges,  civil  society  remained  embryonic.  Nonetheless,  the 
seeds of civil society can be found in small groups and movements that focused 
on human rights and civil freedom, on peace and opposition to nuclear weapons 
or  military  service,  in  favor  of  independently  organized  education  and  for 
samizdat  publication,  for  the  support  of  the  poor,  for  free  trade  unions,  for 
religious  freedom,  and  for  women’s  rights.  These  groups  usually  labeled 
themselves as “non-political” but represented the “closest approximation to, or 
surrogate for, political life” (Skilling 1991: 8-9). As Skilling (1991) explains, 
even after the creation of Charter 77 in 1977, “civic activities were relatively 
few and limited in scope but nonetheless, in spite of repression, persisted for 
more than ten years” (10). The dissidence that did exist followed the path of 
“anti-politics” and was carried out by intellectuals, including writers and literary 




One of the most important and famous civil rights organizations from the period 
of Czechoslovakia’s democratization process is Charter 77. This organization, 
headed by intellectuals such as Václav Havel, Jan Patočka, Jiří Němec, Zdeněk 
Mlynář, Pavel Kohout, Petr Uhl, Jiří Hájek, and Ludvík Vaculík, decided in the 
aftermath of the trial against the rock band the Plastic People of the Universe 
(PPU) that something had to be done (Long 2005: 12). As Saxonberg (2001) 
vividly  explains,  the  trial  against  PPU,  and the  accompanying disregard  for 
human rights that the government had committed itself to just months before, 
caused such moral outrage among the intellectuals that they “abandoned their 
political  ideology and embarked on a  struggle  to  defend human rights.  The 
Helsinki  Accords  on  human  rights,  which  the  Communist-led  regimes  had 
signed, encouraged the dissidents to demand their regimes’ compliance” (153). 
Among the  intellectuals  involved  in  Charter  77,  Havel,  Patočka,  and  Hájek 
would serve as the organization’s spokespeople and “represent the Charter vis-
à-vis the authorities and the public at home and abroad” (Kusin 1978: 308).
Shepherd (2000) describes the Charter as a “mainly Czech organization, 
grouping former communists, anti-communists and non-political intellectuals.” 
As already noted,  “its  main aim was to  get  Czechoslovakia  to adhere to its 
obligations under the 1975 Helsinki Final Act” (31). This strategy of holding the 
government  accountable  for  its  political  commitments  and  obligations 
represents  the  true  genius  of  Charter  77.  Although  initially  an  extension  of 
Havel’s and other group members’ moral persuasion that individuals had a duty 
to “live in truth,” the emphasis on human rights was to eventually become a 
strategic  goldmine  when Gorbachev  announced his  own inclination  to  these 
values (Eyal 2003: 73).
Charter 77 took its name from its founding document. The human rights 
based  declaration  was  initially  signed  by  240  intellectuals  and  released  on 
January 1, 1977. Kusin (1978) describes the Charter as “a combination of a 
statement, a petition and a declaration of intent. More specifically, the Charter   
comprehensively details the litany of violations of both Helsinki and the UN 
covenants. Freedom of expression is described as illusory, given that “tens of 
thousands of our citizens” are prevented from work in their professions because 
their views differ from those officially sanctioned and “countless young people” 
are prevented from attending university because of their own views or those of 
their  parents.  The  document  criticizes  the  “centralized  control  of  all  the 
communications  media  and publishing  and cultural  institutions,”  the  lack  of 
freedom  of  religion,  freedom  of  association,  and  the  curtailment  of  civil 
liberties.  Existing  legal  norms  were  condemned  for  their  lawlessness, 
arbitrariness, and disrespect of civil rights. (Falk 2003: 89)
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Rather shrewdly, Charter 77 sought to avoid political persecution by explicitly 
defining  itself  as  a  non-political  entity  composed  of  people  with  different 
political,  religious/cultural,  and  professional  outlooks.  “Its  authors  and 
signatories wanted to remain within the bounds of the law,” and therefore went 
as far as to identify the organization’s mission “as helping the Czechoslovak 
government  implement  its  own  laws:  the  Universal  Declaration  of  Human 
Rights and the 1975 Final  Act  of the Helsinki  Covenant on Human Rights” 
(Tucker  2000:  124).  Furthermore,  “from  the  beginning,  Charter  77  was  a 
‘virtual’ organization – no rules, permanent bodies, formal membership, fund-
raising  capacity,  or  legal  existence.  Anyone  who  embraced  its  ideas  or 
participated in its work was essentially a member” (Falk 2003: 89). 
Perhaps  surprisingly  given  its  fame  in  the  aftermath  of  the 
democratization of the country, the Charter never achieved a large membership. 
Because  of  perpetual  government  harassment,  only  a  small  number  of 
committed activists were willing to risk prosecution and lengthy prison terms, 
including Havel and some of the other leaders. Consequently the Charter was 
made up of “a few thousand people at the fringes, a few hundred near the center, 
a few dozen real leaders” (Stokes 1993: 149). This assessment of the Charter’s 
membership  is  echoed by  Shepherd  (2000)  who refers  to  the  organization’s 
struggle as “a lonely one.”
By the mid-1980s the dissidents may have numbered only around a thousand or 
so in a country of over 15 million… But their significance was enormous. They 
testified to the refusal of the spirit of freedom and truth to lie down in the face 
of overwhelming odds. Their very existence was an indictment of the corrupt 
elite  which  ran  the  country  and  it  pricked  the  consciousnesses  [sic]  of  the 
population at large. (33)
In addition to  its  important  domestic  role  of  showing that  opposition to  the 
regime was in fact a personal choice and an available option, the Charter played 
an important international part in Eastern Europe’s transition to democracy. Its 
declaration was published by Western European media outlets and eventually 
reached  activists  in  other  communist  countries.  Furthermore,  the  Charter 
actively  engaged  in  dialogue  with  other  dissidents,  including  members  of 
Poland’s KOR and Solidarity (Chilton 1995: 199; Falk 2003: 91). Charterists 
also reached out to peace activists in the West and made appeals to international 
organizations, particularly those connected to the UN (Falk 2003: 91). I will 
discuss some of the specific protest activities employed by the Charter in the 
last section of the report (Protest).     
While  Charter  77  was  the  most  important  civil  society  organization 
operating in the decade leading up to the Velvet Revolution, it was its offspring 
-  the  Civic  Forum  (CF)  -  that  brought  the  democratization  process  to  its 
conclusion. Unlike its  predecessor,  CF could not boast  a long organizational 
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legacy from before the revolution – it was in fact created as late as two days 
after the  November  17th demonstration  that  marked  the  beginning  of  the 
revolution. However, as it was led by the same individuals who had been in 
charge of Charter 77, CF adopted the same organizational structure and strategy 
as that organization: there were no formal leaders, anyone who felt moved to 
join the Forum was automatically a member, and the CF was explicitly non-
political.  The CF almost instantaneously became the umbrella organization of 
the opposition as “Charter 77 and VONS immediately declare themselves a part 
of Civic Forum, but so did just about every recently created independent civic 
initiative” (Heimann 2009). 
Perhaps in an effort to appear as far from a political party as possible, CF 
organized itself in an extremely horizontal fashion. Glenn has aptly described 
the structure of the organization: 
There was a three-tiered structure to the coordinating center: the crisis crew, 
composed of  Václav  Havel,  Jiří  Križan,  and Saša  Vondra,  which  met  every 
morning at 8:00 A.M. and made basic decisions that were discussed with the 
action group of approximately twenty people; later these decisions would be 
presented to the plenum of around 150 people, which was the final opportunity 
for  discussion  before  the  daily  press  conference.  In  explicit  contrast  to  the 
hierarchical  structure  of  the  Communist  Party  and  consistent  with  the  civil 
society  collective  action  frame,  Civic  Forum  defined  its  structure  as 
decentralized and local… It was to have no hierarchy whatsoever but rather to 
be “a horizontal network, with all local Civic Forums joined to one coordinating 
center.” (Glenn 2001: 181)
Together with the students, driving the revolution on the ground, CF became the 
most important entity of the revolution. When the time came to negotiate the 
transition to  democracy,  Havel  and the Civic  Forum emerged as  the natural 
voices of the country. I will return to the protest strategies utilized by the Forum 
in the last section of the report.
Charter 77 and Civic Forum were the two most important organizations 
for democracy in the transition period, but other organizations also existed. I 
will now briefly address those groups. VONS [Výbor na Obranu Nespravedlivě 
Stihaných]  (The  Committee  for  the  Defense  of  the  Unjustly  Persecuted) 
emerged as an alternative organization alongside the Charter, sharing many of 
its members. Established on April 27, 1978, VONS was modeled on the Polish 
KOR with  the  objective  of  aiding victims  of  state  prosecution  by  attending 
trials, collecting evidence, providing legal advice, and assisting the families of 
political prisoners (Falk 2003: 92).
On the same day that CF was created (November 18, 1989), its Slovakian 
counterpart also came into existence. Like CF, Public Against Violence (VPN) 
was  composed  of  a  coalition  of  artists  and  writers.  VPN  did  not  play  an 
enormous role in the revolution, but it did organize protests in Bratislava and 
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participated  in  the  roundtable  discussions  alongside  CF.  Perhaps  its  most 
important role was to contribute to the sense of national unity between Czechs 
and Slovaks, since the CF was heavily dominated by Czechs. (Glenn 2001: 141; 
Judt 1992: 98-100). Another organization that played a small but important role 
in the democratization process was MOST (meaning “bridge”). Formed as late 
as  August  1989 by  the  journalist  Michal  Horáček  and the  musician  Michal 
Kocáb,  MOST  sought  to  act  as  a  link  between  the  government  and  the 
opposition by trying to initiate dialogue between the two sides (Glenn 2001: 
169). While less than completely successful in its aims in the months leading up 
to the revolution (Calda 1996: 136), MOST “had at least established contacts 
which made it easier to bring about negotiations between Adamec and Havel, 
once  the  revolution  began.  For  in  MOST Adamec  and  Krejčí  found  people 
whom they could trust more than the villainized Charterists” (Saxonberg 2001: 
322-3). Other democratization organizations included Democratic Initiative (DI, 
created in 1987) and the Movement  for  Civil  Liberties  (which published its 
manifesto  in  October  1988).  Both  of  these  organizations  differed  from  the 
Charter and CF in that they were explicitly political (Glenn 2001: 139; Stokes 
1993: 153). While the Movement for Civil Liberties appears to have played a 
limited role, DI made at least one significant contribution before uniting under 
the CF umbrella in the early days of the revolution.
A petition under the title “Just a Few Sentences” (echoes of the 1968 document 
“Two Thousand Words”) gathered over forty-thousand signatories in support of 
its demand for democratization and, on September 15 [1989], twenty-two of its 
original  and more  prominent  signatories  (Vaclav  Havel  among them)  sent  a 
letter to Prime Minister Ladislav Adamec requesting talks between government 
and opposition on the reform and liberalization of Czechoslovak politics. (Judt 
1992: 97)
The democratization movements helped set the stage for the revolution and the 
transition, but it was the students of Czechoslovakia who drove the movement 
for change. 
Student movements
Like most countries, Czechoslovakia boasted a tradition of student activism. For 
example,  the  date  chosen  for  the  initial  demonstration  of  the  revolution, 
November 17th, was the fiftieth anniversary of the murder of a student at the 
hands of the Nazis (Urban 1990: 116; Stokes 1993: 155). In the mid-1960s the 
frequency  of  student  mobilization  increased  drastically  in  response  both  to 
domestic  problems  and  to  reflect  the  effects  of  developments  in  Western 
Europe.2 It  therefore  comes  as  no  surprise  that  students  were  central  to  the 
2 Falk (2000: 28) has noted the “striking similarity” between student opposition in Eastern and Western Europe 
in the 1960s and documented extensive student activism in this period.
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resistance effort in 1968 when both the official communist youth organization 
and the Union of University Students became foci for mobilization. Not only 
did the students mobilize on campuses and in the streets, they also challenged 
the Warsaw Pact invasion symbolically by publishing their own Action Program 
based  on  the  values  of  the  United  Nations  Declaration  of  Human  Rights 
(Shepherd 2000: 28).
While I am saving the chronology of events of the revolution for the last 
section  of  this  report,  a  few words  may  be  said  about  the  development  of 
student activism in the late 1980s. There were no independent student unions 
present  in  the  country  until  the  summer  of  1989  when  “student  activists 
throughout Prague started an independent student organization, STUHA, with 
the goal  of  establishing a  self-governing organ for  the students” (Saxonberg 
2001: 329). Until then, students had been organized through the state sanctioned 
Socialist  Union  of  Youth  (SSM).  The  leader  of  this  organization,  Vlasil 
Mohorita, came to play a significant role in the organization of the November 
17th demonstration. While not necessarily in favor of democratization, he had 
expressed  himself  favorably  toward  a  Czechoslovakian  version  of  the  twin 
policies  of perestroika and  glasnost,  which  “created  a  political  opening,  by 
giving more autonomy to the local SSM organizations. Students did not hesitate 
to take advantage of this” (Saxonberg 2001: 323-4). In addition SSM joined 
with independent students in organizing the demonstrations commemorating the 
student victim of 1939, which explains why the demonstration was approved by 
the regime.
As I will show in the next section, students played perhaps  the central 
role in the Velvet Revolution. As Saxonberg (2001) poetically asserts, “although 
the known dissidents had become more daring and radical during the past year, 
their children at the universities outdid them in baldness. These young adults 
eventually became the catalysts of the revolution” (328). Nonetheless, students 
only  began  to  organize  in  the  last  year  of  the  communist  era.  Again, 
Saxonberg’s (2001) research is informative:
Students at some faculties of the Charles University began printing independent 
journals  under  the  protection  of  the  SSM.  During  1989  student  activity 
increased in other areas as well. At the pedagogical facility in early 1989, over 
400  students  signed  a  petition  to  prevent  the  expulsion  of  7  students  for 
participation in the Palach demonstration… Around this time, activists created a 
group called “Student Forum” to organize discussions among the students. And 
when  the  faculty  committee  interrogated  the  student  activist  Semín  on 
November 13, over 100 students came to the meeting to support him by singing 
and blowing bubbles. In the spring of 1989, 32 students at the Prague Economic 
University  signed  a  petition  which  was  sent  to  the  Ministry  of  Education, 
demanding the abolishment of mandatory courses in the indoctrination subjects 
such as “scientific Marxism” and “the history of the Czechoslovak workers’ 
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movement.” In the summer of 1989, student activists throughout Prague started 
an independent student organization, STUHA, with the goal of establishing a 
self-governing organ for the students. This organization planned the November 
17 demonstration which sparked off the “velvet revolution.” (Saxonberg 2001: 
328-9) 
Labor Movement
Somewhat surprisingly for a communist country (or perhaps not), workers were 
relatively absent from the events leading up to the revolution. Although Kusin 
(1978: 310) reports that one third of the first 800 people to sign the Charter in 
the 1970s were workers, this social group is largely absent from most accounts 
of civil society in Czechoslovakia. This is perhaps not altogether surprising, as 
no independent trade union existed in the country. Consequently, workers could 
only  organize  through  the  regime  and  the  party,  which  naturally  made 
opposition to these entities unlikely. The passivity of the workers can also be 
explained, as noted above, by the tacit agreement established between the Party 
and the workers: we will provide a reasonable standard of living and you will 
not cause any trouble.  
The political stance of the nation’s workers was not clear until November 
27th when the announced two-hour general strike was set to begin, and “students 
and intellectuals were nervous (and in some cases pessimistic) as to the degree 
of support they would get from the industrial working class” (Judt 1992: 101). 
However, the workers did not disappoint the revolutionaries as “hundreds of 
little Civic Forums in the factories managed to mobilize huge support for the 
general strike. It was at this point that the credibility of the ‘Workers’ State’ 
collapsed and the confidence of the revolutionary leadership found firm ground” 
(Judt 1992: 101). While largely absent from the civil society activities of the 
decade preceding the revolution, workers thus came to play an important role in 
the  velvet  revolution,  as  their  abandonment  of  the  regime  represented  the 
proverbial  final  nail  in  the  coffin  (Shepherd  2000:   37).  Saxonberg  notes, 
however, that the workers “were not organized around their own interests” and 
that they therefore “quickly lost influence once the populace demobilized and a 
group  of  intellectuals  and  professional  experts  took  control  of  the 
‘technicalities’ of socio-economic transformation” (Saxonberg 2001: 390-1). 
Religious movements
The role of the Catholic Church (the only organized religious activism worthy 
of  the name)  is  somewhat  difficult  to  assess.  While  Judt  (1992)  claims that 
“though not as much as in Poland of course, the dissident Catholic community 
played an important role in Charter 77 throughout the 1980s, as well as in the 
November revolution itself” (111), Saxonberg (2001) argues that “the Catholic 
Church was extremely passive before 1988,” although he admits  that  “some 
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individual  priests  became dissidents”  (221).  In  reality,  it  seems the Catholic 
Church did engage in some anti-government activities, especially in Slovenia, 
but that these were mainly focused on issues of religious freedom rather than 
the promotion of democracy. 
The Church had a difficult relationship with the dissidents, as it sought to 
balance its somewhat fragile position with its core values. Cardinal František 
Tomášek, the archbishop of Prague, was pressured by the authorities to sign a 
declaration condemning Charter 77 shortly after its publication. He eventually 
did so and “was then allowed to take up his position as archbishop” (Heimann 
2009: 288). The government probably felt it had the religious authorities under 
control. “In the 1980s, however, when the regime increased its pressure on the 
church in response to the dual threats it felt emanating from Poland and from a 
revivified papacy under John Paul II, a backlash developed among Catholics” 
(Stokes 1993: 152). As a consequence, the Church, and Tomášek personally, 
became more willing to stand up to the government over time.  
It was the ceremony to commemorate the 1,100th anniversary of the death of St 
Methodius, which was held at Velehrad in Moravia on 7 July 1985, which first 
brought Catholic anti-regime feeling out into the open. In the presence not only 
of observant Catholics but also of a papal representative and Cardinal František 
Tomášek, a local Communist official was booed and whistled down when he 
tried to avoid any explicitly Christian vocabulary by introducing the ceremony 
as the “peace festival of Velehrad…” The faithful shouted “We want religious 
Freedom!  We want  the  Holy Father!  Long Live  the  Church!”  If  only for  a 
moment,  “the  secret  church  came  aboveground”  in  front  of  “some  150,000 
people.” (Heimann 2009: 293)
Religious  activism  continued  to  increase  in  the  second  half  of  the  1980s, 
particularly in Slovakia. In late 1987, Moravian Catholics circulated a petition 
calling for  greater  religious freedom and the separation of  church and state. 
Depending on the scholar, this petition garnered between 300,000 and 600,000 
signatures within six months after Cardinal Tomášek pleaded with Catholics to 
sign the petition, arguing that it was un-Christian to display fear and cowardice. 
The “unintended consequence of Catholic activism was one of the few instances 
of a broad civil  society developing among the Czechs and Slovaks” (Stokes 
1993:  152).  Nonetheless,  Innes  reports  that  nationalistic  disagreements 
remained  between  Czechs  and  Slovaks  as  “Slovak  religious  protest  was 
persistently disregarded as ‘dissent’ by the Czechs” (Innes 2001: 37). This is 
particularly  noteworthy  as  Czech  dissidents  “were  content  to  view religious 
protest  in  Poland as  both anti-Communist  and pro-democratic” (Innes 2001: 
37). While religious activism took place and mobilized large numbers of people, 
it seems clear that the Church played a relatively small role in the transition to 




Hungarian minorities began to mobilize in the late 1970s, and like Charter 77 
focused on their lack of human rights as a minority. In 1978, they formed the 
Committee for the Legal Defense of the Hungarian Minority and in 1983 their 
leader, Miklós Duray, affixed his signature to Charter 77. The organization was 
not mainly political, focusing instead on the importance of Hungarian education 
in schools. It is worth noting, as Falk does, that “in a smart strategic move at 
coalition building, Charter 77 protested discrimination against the Hungarians, 
and  presented  a  proposal  on  national  minorities  to  the  Vienna  CSCE 
conference”  (Falk  2003:  96).  Besides  the  Hungarian  movement,  the  most 
interesting ethnic/national aspect of the Czechoslovak democratization process 
is that the Slovaks remained fairly uninterested in joining the opposition until 
1989. Most opposition activity until that point came from Czech dissidents.
New social movements/s
Slovakia hosted an ecological movement that managed to locate itself in the 
grey  zone  between  allowed  and  forbidden  organizing  by  focusing  on  the 
country’s horrendous environmental situation. The movement gained strength 
“thanks to” the Chernobyl disaster. (Heimann 2009: 294-5)
Protest
It  makes  some  sense  to  return  to  the  chronological  division  of  the 
democratization process into three stages (1968, mid-1970s, and mid- to late-
1980s) that I outlined in the periodization discussion above when seeking to 
understand the protest strategies of the opposition. The non-violent mass tactics 
used to resist the Warsaw Pact invasion of 1968 returned in the late 1980s after 
being suppressed for two decades. In the twenty-year period in between 1968 
and 1989, and especially since the establishment of Charter 77, the opposition 
had been forced to rely on less confrontational protest tactics, and it is here that 
my account begins. 
“Charter 77,” Falk (2009) explains, “was predominantly an organization 
of  writers  and intellectuals,  and  thus  its  forte  and principal  activity  was  its 
endless  publication  of  documents  –  declarations,  open  letters,  and 
communiqués” (Falk 2003: 91). In addition to publishing statements designed to 
pressure the regime into respecting human rights and other democratic values, 
Charter 77 engaged in concrete activities to lend credibility to its claims that the 
regime was indeed not respecting the laws of the country. As Kusin asserts, 
this was mainly achieved through the pursuance of one of the aims the Charter 
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set itself at the start, namely ‘to document grievances and suggest remedies.’ 
The Charter has issued statements on individual and collective infringements of 
rights  and freedoms,  supported by documentary evidence.  These are  the so-
called  Documents of  the  Charter,  which  appeared  in  a  numbered  sequence. 
(Kusin 1978: 321)
 
Similar “non-direct” types of protest accompanied Charter 77’s documentation 
of human rights abuses. As in Poland, unofficial seminars were organized where 
renowned scholars, including major names from outside Eastern Europe, gave 
lectures on topics considered too controversial to be discussed at the universities 
(Falk  2003).  Related  to  this  development  was  the  emergence  of  a  “parallel 
industry of alternative presses” that published literary and musical works that 
had been banned by  the  state  (Falk  2003:  94).  Unlike  the  situation  in  East 
Germany, this  samizdat (self-publication) culture flourished in Czechoslovakia 
and  enjoyed  widespread  circulation  among  the  dissidents  (Saxonberg  2001: 
222). 
In the pre-Gorbachev days of unrestrained government repression, these 
types of protest activity, albeit not “safe” by any stretch of the imagination, did 
allow activists  to  challenge  the  state  in  an  indirect  and less  confrontational 
manner. However, more confrontational activities began to emerge in the late 
1980s as developments in the Soviet Union and neighboring Eastern European 
countries signaled that the rules of the game might be changing.  Corresponding 
to  the  most  immediate  phase  of  the  transition  to  democracy,  the  period 
surrounding  Gorbachev’s  ascent  to  power  witnessed  the  return  of  pre-1969 
forms of protest – demonstrations and strikes. I have already addressed some of 
the non-political activities of the Catholic Church, and to these we must add an 
increasing  number  of  similar  demonstrations  by  secular  activists, 
demonstrations  that  over  time  became increasingly  political.  While  I  cannot 
document every mass protest that occurred in Czechoslovakia in the late 1980s, 
what follows is a chronology of some of the most important demonstrations of 
the period.
That  the  return  of  the  “demonstration  culture”  began  with  apolitical 
protests is  suggested by the fact that the religious protests of the mid-1980s 
were followed by secular ones with non-political overtones. For example, on 
December 8, 1985, one thousand activists gathered in Prague to commemorate 
the fifth anniversary of John Lennon’s murder. While participants in this small 
demonstration  eventually  began  to  call  for  “freedom  and  peace”  as  they 
marched across the Charles Bridge on their way to Prague’s impressive castle, 
they were content  to  focus  their  demands on the  end of  the  deployment  of 
nuclear  warheads in Europe and “left  peacefully  at  around 9:00 p.m.” (Falk 
2003: 97-8). 
August 21, 1988, witnessed “the largest independent demonstration since 
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1969”  as  about  10,000  people  took  to  the  streets  to  mark  the  twentieth 
anniversary of the 1968 invasion (Falk 2003:98). The security forces appear to 
have  been taken by surprise  by this  demonstration and did not  immediately 
intervene. A possible explanation for this was the opposition’s shrewd decision 
to stage the protest on the anniversary of the invasion, thus making government 
action more difficult to justify. In contrast, the StB (secret police) violently and 
quickly repressed a “similar demonstration” the following month (Falk 2003: 
98; Urban 1990). This strategy of staging protests on important anniversaries 
continued throughout the democratization period and can be thought of as a 
“free protest space.” For scholars of non-violent action this is not an unknown 
phenomenon. These types of protests are often referred to as “dilemma actions” 
– protesting on a date or in a manner that has an historical or cultural meaning 
that not even the state can question can make repression costly and difficult, 
thus allowing activists the space needed to stage their protests. 
On  January  15,  1989,  5,000  activists  took  advantage  of  the  20th 
anniversary of Jan Palach’s public suicide in protest against the Soviet invasion. 
On January 16, 1969, Palach had set himself ablaze in central Prague, dying 
three days later as a result of his self-inflicted injuries. Since then, Palach had 
been seen as a martyr and a symbol of Czechoslovakian independence (Urban 
1990: 114). The protestors had planned their demonstration for the day before 
the anniversary in order to “highlight the differences between the pretentions of 
the government, which on this day was signing a new accord on human rights at 
the Vienna meeting of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe 
(CSCE), and the realities of its repression” (Stokes 1993: 154). When protesters 
attempted to lay flowers at the site of Palach’s sacrifice the police attacked and 
arrested  nearly  one  hundred of  them,  including Havel.  Over  the next  week, 
smaller demonstrations that resulted in more arrests and violent crackdowns by 
the regime occurred (Stokes 1993; Urban 1990).
On June 29, four authors (including Havel) announced that 11,500 people 
had signed their  petition  entitled  A Few Sentences (a  reference  to  a  similar 
Prague  Spring  document).  Eventually,  some  30,000  individuals,  including 
people  from  every  walk  of  life,  signed  this  document  that  demanded  “the 
release  of  political  prisoners,  the  ending  of  persecution  of  independent 
initiatives, the freeing of the media and all cultural activity, respect for religious 
rights,  the  public  presentation  of  all  projects  on  the  environment,  and  free 
discussion  of  the  events  of  the  1950s,  the  Prague  Spring  and  Warsaw pact 
invasion,  and the period of  normalization”  (Skilling 1991:  20;  Stokes  1993: 
155). This return to the earlier tactic of non-confrontational engagement with 
the state was however only temporary. On August 21st, on the 21st anniversary of 
the  Warsaw Pact  invasion  and  only  one  day  after  the  announcement  of  the 
establishment of a Solidarity-led government in Poland, 3,000 people protested 
in  Wenceslas  Square  resulting  in  400  arrests.  Continuing  the  tradition  of 
exploiting  important  dates,  another  rally  took  place  in  the  same  square  on 
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October  28  to  commemorate  the  1918  founding  of  the  Republic  of 
Czechoslovakia, naturally a difficult  target for the state to repress. This time 
10,000 people participated (Humphrey 1990). 
As noted several  times in this  report,  the Velvet  Revolution began on 
November 17 when a protest march grew out of an officially authorized student 
ceremony in Prague to honor the death of a Czech student at the hands of the 
Nazis fifty years earlier. Once again, activists took advantage of an historical 
event as the communist government “could not very well cancel this traditional 
anti-Nazi ceremony” (Stokes 1993: 155). Fifty thousand people, including many 
students,  gathered  in  Prague  for  the  ceremony  and  subsequently,  possibly 
encouraged by agents provocateurs, began to march toward the city center. Soon 
they encountered riot police and fighting broke out. Judt (1992) suggests that 
“the police were almost certainly operating under orders to overreact, though it 
remains unclear just who so instructed them, and why” (98). In the resulting 
chaos a rumor arose the following day that a student, Martin Šmíd, had been 
killed  by  the  security  forces.  While  arrests  and  injuries  had  accompanied 
virtually  every  previous  demonstration  over  the  past  few  years,  a  dead 
demonstrator was a novelty and more than the outraged Czechoslovaks could 
take. Thus the November 17 protest represents the most important date of the 
revolution  and  certainly  qualifies  as  an  eventful  protest  in  the  sense  that  it 
transformed the mindsets not only of those participating in the demonstration, 
but in effect the entire nation. 
The demonstration and the rumored death stirred the nation into action. 
As mentioned above, the weekend saw the birth of Civic Forum and its Slovak 
counterpart Public Against Violence. In addition, on November 18th, 
much  of  the  Czech  theater  community  gathered  at  the  Realistic  Theater  in 
Prague,  where  one  of  the  demonstrators  from the  theater  academy read  the 
students’ proclamation calling for a general strike on November 27. The same 
afternoon,  the  coordinating  committee  of  Prague  students  was  formed, 
composed of two representatives of each faculty… That evening, members of 
the  theater  community  at  the  Realistic  Theater  prepared  a  proclamation 
declaring themselves to be on strike and in support of the student demands, 
including the general strike.” (Glenn 2001: 132-3)
Although Civic Forum became the national mouthpiece of the revolution, its 
organizational locus was to be found within Czechoslovakia’s theaters and its 
student  population.  Together,  they  organized  protests  on  a  near  daily  basis 
beginning on Monday, November 20. 
While the theater strike was important in the sense that it set a “strike 
agenda”  for  the  nation  in  anticipation  of  the  general  strike  scheduled  for 
November  27th,  the  network  of  theaters  fulfilled  additional  roles  during  the 
revolution. Given the theater’s central place in Czech culture and in its history 
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of  contentious  politics,  this  is  not  perhaps  surprising.  For  example,  “in  the 
nineteenth century, when the area that would become Czechoslovakia remained 
under  the  control  of  the  Austro-Hungarian  Empire,  theater  was  widely 
understood as a tool for awakening national consciousness, since Czech could 
be  spoken  in  the  theaters  while  German  was  the  official  public  language” 
(Glenn 2001: 147). Similarly, “after the Warsaw Pact invasion in 1968, theaters 
acted as public spaces for  political  expression because they had a degree of 
institutional  autonomy  lacking  in  factories  and  churches  and  a  theatrical 
language that enabled them to express opinions in a manner difficult  for the 
state to control” (Glenn 2001: 148). The Velvet Revolution benefitted from this 
cultural heritage, as theaters once again became centers for anti-state activity.
Over time, the Czechoslovak state had built a dense network of theaters. 
Now, these government institutions would be used against their former masters. 
The  days  following  the  November  17th demonstration  witnessed  “the 
transformation of  the  theaters  into  local  branches  of  the movement”  (Glenn 
2001: 143). The “theater branches” of the Civic Forum were important because, 
unlike “those founded in factories, research institutes, or schools, … they did 
not represent one group of society but rather, like their parent body, a forum in 
which members of all groups of society met regularly” (Glenn 2001: 147). Put 
succinctly, the theater provided the revolution not only with free spaces, but also 
with  neutral  spaces  in  which  no  societal  group  appeared  to  be  jostling  for 
position.
Finally, the theater network served a strictly organizational function as the 
center  of  the  revolutionary  movement  and  its  communication  activities. 
Following the student demonstration that triggered the revolution, students and 
actors worked together as they traveled outside of the capital to inform people 
in other cities of the events in Prague. This dissemination effort was a crucial 
component of the revolutionaries’ strategy to decentralize their movement, and 
“the Theater Institute in Prague served as the information and documentation 
center  of  the  Czech  theater  community  for  these  trips”  (Glenn  2001:  151). 
While one should not overstate the importance of the theater network for the 
outcome of the Velvet Revolution, it seems beyond doubt that the revolution 
would have looked very different without it. As Glenn concludes
By the  morning  of  November  26  the  Theater  Institute  in  Prague  recorded 
branches of Civic Forum in fourteen theaters in Prague and in eighteen cities 
outside  of  Prague,  including  the  capitals  of  the  six  regions  of  the  Czech 
Republic.  Slovak  theaters,  with  which  the  Czech  theater  community  had 
excellent  contacts,  followed quickly.  This  provided an important  network of 
communication throughout the country, located in places that would be familiar 
to all  citizens (who might not, for example,  know where the university or a 
particular factory room would be) and would be heated (which was important, 
since it was, after all, November). In the packed theaters at night, people from 
all parts of society came to listen or to present information about the situation 
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and to discuss the course of events. (Glenn 2001: 154)
    
Against the backdrop of university and theater strikes, and in anticipation of the 
November  27th two-hour  general  strike,  demonstrators  calling  for  a  new 
government rallied throughout the country on a daily basis.  For example,  in 
Prague’s central Wenceslas Square 200,000 rallied on the 20th, 500,000 each on 
the 25th and 26th, and 200,000 as the general strike came into effect on the 27 th 
(Humphrey 1990). Having committed itself to refrain from the use of violence 
following  the  “death”  of  Šmíd  on the  17th,  the  state  was  no longer  able  to 
frighten  the  population  into  submission.  The massive  demonstrations  clearly 
signaled  to  both  sides  that  power  now resided  with  the  opposition,  and  in 
particular with Civic Forum and Havel. Roundtable discussions were now the 
logical  next  step,  occurring  against  a  background  of  potential  new  and 
devastating strikes that were only a Havel phone call away. On December 10 th, 
only twenty-three days after the first demonstration of the revolution, a majority 
non-communist government was sworn into office.
Two  aspects  of  the  Velvet  Revolution  are  worth  highlighting  more 
specifically. First, the revolution was non-violent. As Glenn explains,
Civic Forum sought to heighten the sense of moral outrage by emphasizing the 
non-  violence  of  the  demonstrating  students  (in  contrast  to  an  unruly 
demonstration by professional agitators)… Central to the civil society framing 
strategy is  the  identity  of  its  adherents  as  a  united  citizenry  endowed  with 
human rights whose will the movements claimed to represent against the state… 
The agency  component  of  the  civil  society  framing strategy  was  defined  as  
peaceful participation in the general strike and negotiations with the state, at  
which Civic Forum would pressure the state  to make the necessary changes 
[emphasis added]… The emphasis on nonviolence and peaceful methods filled 
the  public  statements  of  Civic  Forum,  which  announced  in  its  daily  news 
service, “[L]et us refuse any form of terror and violence. Our weapons are love 
and nonviolence.” (Glenn 2001: 143-5)
By employing non-violent resistance the opposition offered the regime a way 
out of the conflict. It seems likely that the regime was willing to accept this 
option in the context of earlier regime change in Poland, Hungary, and East 
Germany. The second aspect worth mentioning, and one that is closely related 
to the first, is the fact that the opposition refrained from humiliating the regime. 
Content  to make demands “notable for their modesty” (Glenn 2001: 146), it 
seems  plausible  that  Civic  Forum  and  other  organizations  facilitated  the 
regime’s  decision  to  negotiate.  As Glenn concludes,  “despite  the  fall  of  the 
Leninist  regimes  in  neighboring  countries,  the  [opposition]  did  not  call  for 
fundamental changes in the system, but almost a reformist spirit calling for the 
redress of human rights abuses” (Glenn 2001: 146). 
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Conclusion
This  report  has  sought  to  highlight  the  role  of  civil  society  and  its  protest 
activities in the course of Czechoslovakia’s path to democratization. Perhaps the 
most  important  finding  is  that  civil  society  actors  played  a  limited,  albeit 
prolonged and effective role in the decades leading up to the revolution. Having 
put  the  human  rights  issue  on  the  table  in  the  aftermath  of  the  Helsinki 
Agreement,  civil  society  activists  were  able  to  capitalize  on  the  additional 
political opportunities represented by Gorbachev’s reform program and episodes 
of regime change in other Eastern European countries in the late 1980s. In short, 
Charter 77 helped create the structural context in which a non-violent revolution 
swept aside a well-entrenched authoritarian regime relatively easily. As in Iran 
in 1979, where the persistent efforts of human rights activists in the preceding 
decade  and  a  half  created  a  favorable  structural  context  for  a  non-violent 
revolution, Charter 77 contributed to the creation of an iron cage of liberalism in 
Czechoslovakia. By bringing the world’s attention to bear on the human rights 
agenda the government had committed itself to through the Helsinki Final Act, 
the activists eventually made the state’s situation nigh on impossible. Holding 
the regime accountable for protecting the values Moscow (i.e. Gorbachev) now 
advocated, and using non-violent tactics to do so made it impossible for the 
regime to reply in an effective manner. This suggests that scholars may be well 
advised to examine episodes of democratization from below in a historicized 
fashion that considers the causes of such episodes as the result  of long-term 
developments.  Furthermore,  the  findings  of  this  report  suggest  that  political 
opportunity structures need not  be completely “structural.”  Instead,  activists, 
like the members of Charter 77, can help bring such opportunities about through 
their  ongoing  efforts  to  highlight  contradictions  and  inconsistencies  in  the 
natures of the states they are struggling against.   
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